That's sort of what I meant, but I was greatly oversimplifying.
LSE: I'm just concerned that we just bought [X] less than two years ago and [Y consequence].
Me: I understand that, and normally I'd agree with you, but we're not in a normal situation.
LSE: But so far all I hear is speculation.
Me: Look, as I already explained, I've done a lot of research in the last few weeks, and I learned that the value of [X] is highly cyclical. Here is a chart showing the value over the last 150 years. Look at the regularity of the cycle. Now look at [year]. Of course I wouldn't go on this research alone, but the evidence that the value is already starting to go down is all around us. [I cite concrete evidence.] That's why I did the research in the first place. The signs are extremely troubling. And they began about a year ago, and they've been mounting. Values are already dropping in [places A and B]. Those are primary markets. We're dealing with a secondary market, and so it's only a matter of time.
LSE: But don't you think that there's still a chance for the value to go up?
Me: [Looks at LSE sadly.] No.
LSE: [Silent for a minute. LSE looks very uncomfortable.] I can't commit to this based on the information we have. I'd like to bring in [person Z] to see what he thinks. He might have some ideas. [Person Z is an IEE.]
In a situation like this, even though I had in hand concrete evidence, my high level of conviction was based on Ni. It was Ni that led me to gather the facts, and the overall gesture from me was coming from Ni. And it meant my demanding that the LSE do something he didn't want to do, in essence, close off an avenue of possibilities. Because the risk was way too high, the danger signs were all flashing, and only one of us was reading the scenario that way.